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A PUZZLE 
 
This paper addresses a puzzle related to firm size and competition. There is a 
broad consensus that only large, diversified multinational enterprises can compete in 
industries that combine high knowledge-intensity and a high degree of 
internationalization
1. Small firms, by definition, have limited resources and capabilities 
and are unlikely to possess substantial ownership advantages. They are obviously 
constrained in their capacity for knowledge creation. They also have a limited capacity to 
influence pricing and shape the development of markets, market structure, and 
technological change.  
 
The disadvantages of small size for firms are compounded if they come, like in 
the case of Taiwan, from a small country. Small nations are confronted with a vicious 
circle of size-related disadvantages
2: i) The small domestic market places tight 
restrictions on the ability to function as a buffer against heavy fluctuations in international 
demand; ii) It constrains the development of sophisticated “lead users”
3 that could 
stimulate innovation; iii) It also limits the scope for technological spill-overs
4; and iv) the 
limited size of the national knowledge and capital base restricts the choice of industries in 
which such small nations might successfully specialize. 
 
It would thus seem self-evident that small firms from a small country are ill-
equipped to compete in the knowledge-intensive and highly globalized computer 
industry
5. Taiwan’s experience however tells a different story: Small-and-medium-sized 
enterprises  (SMEs) have been the main carriers of its rapid development.  Despite the 
dominance of SMEs, Taiwan today has the most broadly based computer industry in Asia 
outside of Japan. Taiwanese computer firms, almost without exception, have started out 
small and from very humble origins; while many of them failed, a significant number 
were able to grow and to establish themselves as world-class suppliers for a variety of 
computer-related products, key components and knowledge-intensive services. The 
dominance of small firms has obviously not prevented this country from becoming a 
                                                            
1 For concise statements of this consensus position, see Hymer, 1960/1976, Caves, 1982; the last chapter in 
Chandler, 1990, and  Dunning, 1993. 
2 Important contributions are Walsh, 1987;  Freeman and Lundvall (eds.), 1988; and Maskell, 1996. 
3 Von Hippel defines “lead users of a novel or enhanced product, process, or service” as those that “...face 
needs that will be general in the market place, but...(who) face them months or years before the bulk of that 
marketplace encounters them...” and who will “... benefit significantly by obtaining a solution to those 
needs.” (Von Hippel, 1988, p.107) 
4 Technological spill-overs are assumed to be mainly domestically generated by innovation theorists (e.g., 
Lundvall, 1992 and Nelson, 1992) as well as by “new growth” theorists (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991 
and 1993). If this is so, then large countries will benefit more from an investment in R&D than smaller 
countries, where some of the spill-overs of R&D are likely to benefit its trading partners. (Zander and 
Kogut, 1995) 
5 The impact of knowledge intensity and globalization on firm organization and competitive dynamics in the 
electronics industry is analyzed in Richardson, 1997; Bresnahan and Malerba, 1997; Langlois, 1992; 
Langlois and Steinmueller, 1997; and Ernst 1997 b and 1998b. For an early analysis, see Ernst, 1983; and 
Ernst and O`Connor, 1992.  2 
successful competitor in an industry that requires a broad range of fairly demanding 
technological and organizational capabilities. 
 
The key to this puzzle, we argue, is  knowledge outsourcing through a variety of 
inter-organizational linkages. Government policies undoubtedly facilitated the initial 
market entry of small firms and their continuous upgrading
6. Of equal importance 
however are innovations in firm organization related to the creation of knowledge. This is 
in line with the evolutionary, resource-based theory of the firm - Edith Penrose´s   
observation that “... a firm´s rate of growth is limited by the growth of knowledge within 
it.” (1959/95, Foreword, 3d edition, pages XVI and XVII) has drastically changed our 
perceptions of how firms develop and compete
7. Yet, much of the literature on industrial 
organization and the theory of the firm is characterized by an internalist bias
8 - it neglects 
that knowledge creation within the firm requires interaction with other firms and 
organizations




A novel contribution of this paper is its focus on inter-organizational knowledge 
linkages  with other firms and organizations.  We show how strong ties with large 
Taiwanese business groups as well as with public institutions have broadened the scope 
for learning and knowledge creation in Taiwanese computer companies.  A second 
important contribution is that the analysis is extended beyond national boundaries, 
highlighting the importance of international knowledge linkages. We trace the co-
evolution of inter-organizational and international knowledge linkages, and show how 
this has helped small Taiwanese firms to overcome some of their size-related 
disadvantages. Common to all of these different arrangements is an attempt to 
complement the speed and flexibility of smaller firms with  the advantages of scale and 
scope that normally only  large firms can reap.  
 
In contrast to Hobday (1995), and in line with Wong (1999), we also emphasize 
the diversity of such linkages and their non-linear evolutionary character. International 
                                                            
6 Industrial development policies on their own, however, are insufficient to explain Taiwan’s success. This 
is where I differ from Robert Wade´s otherwise extremely stimulating analysis (Wade, 1990) and other 
more recent analyses with a statist bias. 
7 Other seminal contributions include Richardson 1960/1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982; and Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995. 
8 Two versions of the internalist bias can be distinguished. Teece (1998: 148) highlights a focus on internal 
hierarchical control: “Economists, as well as many organization theorists, have traditionally thought of 
firms as islands of hierarchical control embedded in a market structure and interacting with each other 
through the price mechanism.” A second version of the internalist bias relates specifically to innovation: 
capability-based theories of the firm have focused primarily on the internal accumulation of knowledge and 
skills which underpins its productive activity
 (Coombs and Metcalfe, 1998). 
9 Coombs and  Metcalfe (1998:3) have convincingly argued that the “… creation of new capabilities is 
increasingly taking place through the combination of the capabilities of several firms and research 
organizations.“ 
10 This is in line with population level learning theory (Miner and Haunschild, 1995) which shows that 
organizational learning depends in important ways on the interaction of organizations, as opposed to 
feedback from trial and error events inside the organization.  3 
linkages include a variety of ties with sales, manufacturing, and engineering support 
affiliates of foreign firms; they also include different forms and trajectories of integration 
into global production networks (GPN) of American and Japanese electronics firms. 
Taiwanese firms typically have relied on concurrent knowledge outsourcing: they have 
pursued different approaches in parallel, rather than concentrating exclusively on one 
particular linkage. 
 
Part I of this paper describes Taiwan´s achievements in the computer industry, in 
terms of its accumulated capabilities. The dominance of SMEs and their role as a source 
of flexibility is documented in part II. Part III describes policy innovations that have 
enabled small Taiwanese firms to get onto the virtuous circle of co-evolving inter-
organizational and international knowledge linkages. The catalytic role of inward FDI is 
highlighted in part IV. In part V, we inquire how knowledge creation in Taiwanese 
computer companies has benefited from  knowledge outsourcing through participation in 
global production networks. Finally, in part VI, we demonstrate how such international 
linkages have been complemented by evolving domestic inter-organizational linkages. 
 
I. TAIWAN´S ACHIEVEMENTS: A BROAD RANGE OF CAPABILITIES
11 
 
  Over the last decade, Taiwan has established itself as a world-class supply source 
for a variety of electronic hardware  products.  It is the world's largest supplier of 
computer monitors, motherboards, switching power supplies, mouse devices, keyboards, 
scanners and a variety of add-on cards. Almost 60 percent of the world’s desktop PCs 
were either made in Taiwan or contained a motherboard made by a Taiwanese company. 
Since 1994, Taiwan also has become the world's largest manufacturer of notebook PCs.  
Most of these computers are sold to American and Japanese computer companies which 
re-sell them under their own logo, but 70 percent of the computers sold under such OEM 
arrangements have been designed by Taiwanese companies, indicating significantly 
improved design capabilities. 
 
  Progress has been equally impressive in the field of electronic components.   
Taiwan today has hundreds of passive component makers that have established a strong 
position relative to leading Japanese and US competitors.  Taiwanese firms have also 
improved their position in the capital-intensive mass production of precision components, 
such as large-scale CRT picture tubes for computer monitors and sophisticated display 
devices for laptop computers.  The same is true for integrated circuits, where Taiwanese 
producers have a better balanced product portfolio than the Korean chaebol which are 
heavily reliant on the highly volatile DRAM market segment ( Ernst, 1998a and 2000b).
12 
                                                            
11 If not indicated otherwise, data on Taiwan´s computer industry are courtesy of the Market Intelligence 
Center of the Institute for Information Industry (III), Taipei. 
12 The island`s chipmakers now account for roughly 7% of the world DRAM market. Their share however 
rises to 12%, once outsourcing to Japanese chipmakers is taken into account. A large share of this 
production are shipments to Taiwanese PC vendors and their global OEM customers, which are less 
vulnerable to heavy price fluctuations. In addition, Taiwan's semiconductor industry has developed a strong 
position in higher value-added devices, like chip sets, static RAM memories, mask ROMs, and EPROMs.  
Taiwan also is home to the world's leading silicon foundry, TSMC, a company that is able to produce  4 
Two recent structural changes show how Taiwanese firms have upgraded their 
capabilities: a rapid diversification beyond hard core PC-related products into a variety of 
complementary, high-growth market segments, some of which display considerably 
higher profit margins; and a shift from stand-alone manufacturing services to integrated 
service packages that cover a wide range of value chain activities, including higher value-
added support services. Diversification is evident in three areas: the development of PC 
network products
13, especially modems and network interface cards; multimedia 
accessories, such as CD-ROM drives and add-on cards
14, and a variety of information 
services industries, such as multimedia software, system integration, turnkey systems, and 
network services.  These activities owe their existence to the convergence of previously 
separated technologies used for computing, communicating and digital consumer 
applications, and require the capacity to combine various strands of technology to 
generate new applications and markets. 
 
  Taiwanese firms have also developed a capacity to provide a package of services 
across a wide range of value chain activities, which has helped them to sustain their 
position as preferred OEM suppliers.  With the exception of R&D and marketing, 
practically all other stages of the value chain can now be performed by Taiwan’s OEM 
contractors.  Moreover, Taiwanese firms are beginning to shoulder essential coordination 
functions for the global supply chain management of their OEM customers. 
 
  Two characteristic examples of these processes of diversification and the 
provision of integrated service capabilities are scanners and turnkey production 
arrangements. Scanner production demands optical, mechanical and electronic 
technologies and capabilities.  Taiwan has accumulated expertise in all three, and has 
become the world’s largest supplier of scanners.  With a firm grip on all stages of the 
value chain, from R&D and production to marketing and after-sales service, Taiwan is 
positioned to defend its leadership position as a “one-stop shopping center” for scanners. 
 
  A second example is the spread of turnkey production arrangements in the PC 
industry. Compaq for instance has out-sourced all stages of the value chain except 
marketing to Mitac International: the Taiwanese company is responsible for the design 
and development of new products, as well as for manufacturing, transport and after-sales 
services at its manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, China, Britain, Australia and the US. 
For Compaq, Mitac's greatest attraction is its network of plants and sales subsidiaries 
located in most of the world's key computer markets. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
leading-edge ICs on very short production cycles both for major international semiconductor firms and 
smaller design firms. 
13 “PC network products” are defined as “products that are used for LANs (Local Area Networks), PSTN 
(Public Switched Tellephone Network), ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network), ASDL (Asymmetric 
Digital Subscriber Loop) and cable modems. Main products include  “network interface cards, hubs, 
bridging switches, modems and routers.”  
14 Add-on cards include sound, video and graphics cards. Of these, video cards display higher-than-average 
profit margins.  5 
  Taiwan’s achievements would be impressive for any country; they are even more 
impressive for a small, densely populated island. With a population of about 21 million 
people, roughly half the size of South Korea, Taiwan lacked a large and sophisticated 
domestic market, specialized capabilities and support industries, and the science and 
technology infrastructure necessary for developing a broad set of electronics products.  
From the outset, Taiwan’s PC industry depended heavily on international markets and 
access to foreign technology.  Penetrating foreign markets and absorbing imported 
technology, however, requires conscious efforts to develop a variety of domestic 
resources and capabilities through deliberate knowledge creation management.   
 
II. THE DOMINANCE OF SMEs 
 
  There is a rich body of research, based on the assumptions of evolutionary 
economics, that specifies what type of capabilities are required and how the development 
of such capabilities affects firm organization (e.g., Teece, 1998; Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1996; and Gerybadze and Reger,1997)
15. However, much of this literature focuses on 
large multi-divisional corporations and fails to discuss how small enterprises can develop 
such capabilities. This reduces its value for a country like Taiwan where SMEs have been 
the main carriers of economic development and remain important today.  In 1993, SMEs 
accounted for 96 percent of the total number of companies, 69 percent of total 
employment and 55 percent of Taiwan’s manufactured exports (Chen, Tain-Jy et al, 
1995). Taiwan today is home to more than 4,000 electronics firms that produce a broad 
mix of PC-related products and electronic components. Almost all of these companies 
started out as small enterprises. 
 
A source of flexibility 
 
  How did Taiwanese firms succeed in the computer industry?  The answer lies in 
the fundamental characteristics of an industry in which high volatility and uncertainty put 
a premium on flexibility and the capacity to adjust to abrupt and frequently unexpected 
changes in demand and technology.  Small firm size can foster such flexibility
16 . By 
combining incremental product innovation with fast speed-to-market, Taiwanese firms 
have been able to establish a strong international market position relatively early in the 
product cycle.  
 
  The primary source of this flexibility appears to be the specific organization of the 
domestic supply base in Taiwan, especially for parts and components.  Two main features 
of this domestic supply base have contributed to the flexibility of Taiwanese producers, 
the first being an extreme form of specialization.  By engaging in single tasks and by 
producing, purchasing and selling in small lots, subcontractors avoid heavy fixed capital 
costs.  This, in turn, makes it relatively easy to shift production at relatively short notice, 
and with a minimum of costs.  The second feature is an organizational innovation that 
                                                            
15 For an application of this theoretical approach to research on developing countries, see Ernst, Mytelka 
and Ganiatsos, 1998, and Ernst and Lundvall, 1997. 
16  For the underlying argument, see Acs and Audretsch,1992. For a critical assessment, see Harrison, 1994.  6 
helps to avoid possible disadvantages of specialization. Andersen (1996) has recently 
provided an interesting theoretical explanation why excessive specialization may 
constrain innovation
17.  The solution to this dilemma is the establishment of tight linkages 
between firms along the supply chain that enhance the prospects for inter-organizational 
knowledge creation, for instance between end product manufacturers and component 
suppliers.  
 
Taiwan’s computer industry has developed a peculiar network structure of 
multiple, volatile and short-term links that involve only limited financial and technology 
transfers.  Spot-market transactions play an important role, but so do "temporary spider 
web" arrangements that are assembled for the duration of a particular job.
18 Taiwan’s 
computer industry thus displays an extreme form of open and volatile  production 
networks, arguably even more so than the highly flexible production networks that 
characterize California's Silicon Valley ( e.g., Saxenian, 1994, and Luethje, 1999).  Firms 
maximize the number of jobs in order to compensate for the razor-thin profit margins; as 
a result, they avoid being locked into a particular production network.  Domestic supplier 





  If flexibility constitutes one prerequisite for Taiwan’s competitive success in 
computers, economies of scale and scope and speed-to-market have been of equal 
importance.
19  Entry barriers have increased for those stages of the value chain which are 
of critical importance for competitive success, including particularly component 
manufacturing where production-related scale economies remain important.  But the 
epicenter of competition has shifted beyond manufacturing to R&D and other forms of 
intangible investment required to complement price competition with product 
differentiation and speed-to-market.  Only those companies that are able to get the right 
product to the highest volume segment of the market at the right time can survive.  Being 
late often forces companies out of business. 
 
  In sum, what really matters for competitive success are substantial investments in 
the rapid upgrading of a firm's technological and organizational capabilities.  How were 
Taiwanese computer companies able to successfully compete in an industry where size-
related advantages are of critical importance?  And, more specifically, what kind of 
organizational innovations have enabled Taiwanese firms to overcome their size-related 
disadvantages? In order to answer these questions, we need to correct some popular 
                                                            
17 “While standardization appears to be a necessary consequence of the attempts of economic agents to 
exploit economies of scale and to avoid dealing with impossible amounts of information, this may also lead 
to difficulties for innovative activities.” Andersen, 1996, p.98. 
18 For details, see Shieh 1990; and Lam and Lee 1993, p.112. Individual firms often bid for contracts 
beyond their own capacities; once a supplier gets the contract, it calls on other firms, often competitors, to 
help fill the order. 
19 Chandler, 1990, remains the most authoritative source. Economies of scale and scope in the computer 
industry are analyzed in  Flamm, 1988;  Ferguson, 1990; Ernst and O`Connor, 1992; and Ernst, 1997b  7 
misconceptions of the Taiwanese model.  This is not an economy characterized by 
atomistic competition.  SMEs do play an important role, yet their growth is fostered not 
by blind market forces, but by a combination of four institutional innovations: 
government policies that facilitated market entry and upgrading; the catalytic role played 
by foreign sales and manufacturing affiliates; an early participation in global production 
networks (GPN); and, finally, evolving strong linkages with large Taiwanese firms and 
business groups. 
 
III. THE ROLE OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
Peculiar features 
 
Policy and institutional innovations played an important catalytic role: they 
enabled smaller firms to get onto the virtuous circle of co-evolving inter-organizational 
and international knowledge linkages. Five features have distinguished Taiwan’s 
approach: First, no limits were set on the number of firms within each industry group, 
with the exception of a few mining and utility industries.  Any domestic firm could invest 
and enjoy the same tax and other privileges.  This open policy gave rise to intense 
domestic competition, and was conducive to a diversified industry structure. 
 
  Second, the government actively promoted the development and modernization of 
Taiwan´s SME sector
20.  Government assistance to SMEs included market promotion, 
management rationalization, cooperation and promoting strategic alliances, loans and 
upgrading technology and labor training (Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), 1991). 
Third, there was no discrimination against smaller firms within the SME category.  Any 
firm, irrespective of size, could participate and was treated equally.  This neutral policy 
was an important foundation for the development of Taiwan´s large pool of vibrant and 
entrepreneurial SMEs. Fourth, virtually equal treatment was granted to domestic and 
foreign investment, with the exception of some majority share-holding regulations 
applicable to foreign firms and strict foreign exchange control regulations governing 
domestic firms.  This balanced policy attracted foreign investment without producing the 
“crowding-out” that occurred in Singapore, where domestic firms have played a minimal 
role in the manufacturing sector.
21 
 
Finally, an important difference that sets apart Taiwan´s industrial policies is that 
directed credit has played a much less important role, at least until the early 1980s. This 
can be seen from the high real interest rates for secured loans that Taiwanese firms had to 
pay during this period.
22 This has changed only since the mid-1980s, when the focus of 
industrial policy shifted to industrial upgrading. Any firm, irrespective of size, could 
                                                            
20 The first of these policies, “The Rule for Promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises”, was promulgated 
in 1967 and was subsequently revised several times as Taiwan’s SMEs grew.   
21 For an analysis of such crowding-out affects on potential domestic investment in Southeast Asia, see  Lim 
and Pang, 1991. 
22 San Gee ( 1995), table 4. The real interest rates for secured loans in Taiwan were 14.14%, 9.0 %, 8.05% 
and 9.7% respectively in 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1985. There was only one exception: in 1980, the rate fell to 
-2.80, which was primarily due to the second oil crisis in that year. Note that these figures are adjusted for 
inflationary effects.  8 
participate in industrial promotion programmes, including concessionary credit. In 
contrast to the Korean government which used its control of the finance sector to direct 
credit to a handful of chaebol, the Taiwanese government did not try to promote large 
national champions. The result is that Taiwan`s corporate debt-equity ratio is substantially 
lower than in Korea
23: Taiwan´s net debt-equity ratio for 1998 was around 30%, 
compared with more than 180% for Korea (ING Barings estimate, quoted in The 
Economist, November 7, 1998, p.13). Taiwan´s smaller companies thus had to rely more 
on equity markets and corporate retained earnings than on debt.  
 
These peculiar features of  industrial policy have shaped firm behavior, especially 
related to knowledge creation. For instance, Taiwanese firms find it difficult to raise 
capital for large-scale volume production and must submit investment decisions to short-
term financial considerations. As a result, they avoided homogeneous, mass-produced 
products (commodities), at least initially, and have focused differentiated and design-
intensive products and knowledge-intensive support services. Taiwanese firms typically 
emphasize product design and organizational innovations. Their main strength is a quick 
response to changes in markets and technology through flexible specialization in 
manufacturing, procurement and marketing. Taiwanese firms have focused much more on 
inter-organizational linkages: apprentice-type learning arrangements (Kim, 1997, ibid.) 
with large firms (both foreign and domestic) has enabled them to upgrade rapidly from 
relatively simple to increasingly complex forms of international OEM arrangements.
24 
 
The evolution of Taiwan´s industrial policy 
 
Of equal importance is that Taiwan’s policy approach kept evolving in line with 
the increasing complexity of the industry, and a greater exposure to the international 
economy. As Taiwan´s computer industry moved up from simple and labor-intensive to 
more complex products, much more sophisticated policies were required. The main 
reason is that entry barriers rise with increasing complexity: investment thresholds 
increase and knowledge requirements become more demanding. For small enterprises this 




                                                            
23 Scitovsky (1986: chart 1) shows that, in most years between 1971 and 1980, Korea´s corporate sector 
debt to equity was between 310 and 380, while Taiwan´s ratio was much lower between 160 and 180. This 
is consistent with more recent figures quoted in Fields (1995: table 4-5) which show that in 1985, the debt-
equity ratio of Korean manufacturing firms was nearly 350, relative to a ratio of 120 for Taiwan.  
24 There are also downsides to this approach: a lack of access to patient capital has led to a general 
reluctance of Taiwanese firms to engage in R&D, which arguably explains why they lag behind the chaebol 
in sectors that are characterized by extremely high investment thresholds and risks, and where the focus 
primarily is on homogeneous products (like DRAMs  and advanced displays). 
25 Externality requirements vary, depending on the market segment and the stage of development of a 
particular industry. For consumer electronics, they are obviously less demanding than for semiconductors. 
And within the same product group, i.e. semiconductors, such requirements become much more complex, 
once the focus shifts from low-end discrete devices for consumer applications to higher-end design-
intensive devices.  9 
Greater exposure to the international economy is a second reason why industrial 
development policies need to develop over time. Such linkages are necessary to facilitate 
local capability formation. The increasing complexity of Taiwan’s computer industry 
necessitates more international linkages. These encompass critical imports of key 
components and capital equipment, and inward FDI. They also involve participation in 
global production networks (GPN) as well as in a variety of specialized and informal 
“international peer group” networks that are essential carriers of codified as well as tacit 
knowledge. Left on their own, small enterprises are ill-equipped to reap the benefits of 
such international linkages. Again, the market had to be complemented by selective 
policy interventions that can provide some of the necessary externalities. 
 
This process of change can be traced through Taiwan´s industrial policies that 
affected the electronics industry. In the early 1960s, the Taiwanese government 
introduced a series of path-breaking institutional and policy innovations that were 
instrumental for establishing the Taiwanese approach to knowledge creation.  The first 
was the statute for technical cooperation, issued in 1962, under which re-investment and 
the remittance of technology fees accompanying joint ventures were permitted; this had 
the effect of attracting technology from foreign companies.  Much better known is the 
second innovation: the 1965 Law on the Establishment and Management of Export 
Processing Zones, first implemented in December 1966 in Kaohsiung, a port city in the 
south of the island. 
 
  Once the policy focus shifted to secondary import substitution, the provision of 
external economies became critical.  In 1973, the Industrial Technology Research 
Institute (ITRI) was established as part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  ITRI soon 
moved beyond its original task, which was to develop applied industrial technologies for 
key components and capital equipment.  Equally important tasks now included 
international technology scanning and acquisition; technology transfer from foreign 
sources to the domestic SME sector; the development of a nation-wide infrastructure; and 
the formation of specialized clusters of support industries.  ITRI and its specialized 
divisions
26 also proved a source of “migratory knowledge”
27 for the electronics and 
computer industries: top researchers and engineers were continuously encouraged to 
move out into the private sector and to establish innovative start-up companies.
28  
 
  During the 1980s, policy shifted toward industrial targeting, especially for the 
computer industry.  In 1980, the government established an industrial park almost entirely 
devoted to IC manufacturing and computer design, the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial 
                                                            
26 Two such divisions have played a critical role for the development of Taiwan´s computer industry: the 
Electronic Research Service Organization (ERSO) that has focused on the development of key components 
(especially ICs and LCDs); and  the  Computer and Communications Research Laboratories (CCL) that 
focuses on the development of new architectural designs for computers, communications and consumer 
electronics. 
27 This term was coined by Joseph L. Badaracco Jr. (1991, pages 33-47) who defines it as knowledge, both 
explicit and tacit, embodied in individuals who migrate from one organization or country to another. 
28 Typical examples of such spin-offs include UMC and Winbond, both of which today have become 
serious competitors in the integrated circuit industry.  10 
Park (HSIP).  Hsinchu offered a large range of fiscal and related investment incentives to 
attract qualified investment.
29  In turn, companies that have invested in the park must 
spend a certain proportion of their revenues on R&D and a minimum percentage of their 
work force must be scientists and engineers.  Located close to ITRI and two well-known 
technology-oriented universities, Hsinchu was able to replicate to some degree a “Silicon 
Valley”-type informal network that helped to quickly diffuse new technology to Taiwan´s 
computer industry.  The park’s close links with Silicon Valley—many of the top 
executives and engineers of Hsinchu-based companies have worked in the US—
facilitated a rapid response to changing technology and international markets. 
 
Overcoming size-related barriers to knowledge creation 
 
  Throughout these various policy changes, however, the government maintained a 
willingness to assist Taiwanese SMEs in overcoming size-related barriers to knowledge 
creation.  In the computer industry, the best example is the case of the notebook PC 
consortium, established by CCL/ITRI in April 1990.
30  Against strong protest of the 
leading domestic PC manufacturers, the government refused to set any entry 
requirements, except an initial entry fee of $48,000 - a sum which even an SME could 
well afford to pay.  The result was that 46 firms became members of this consortium, and 
thus had equal access to design specifications and prototypes, detailed technical reports 
for each stage of development, motherboard designs, mass production samples and 
training classes.  This example illustrates a peculiar feature of industrial policy making in 
Taiwan noted above; the government supports multiple firms in any technology initiative, 
constantly putting pressure on existing players by bringing in new companies or lower-
tier firms. This has created a powerful vehicle for inter-organizational knowledge 
creation. 
 
  Of course, such a government policy to stimulate knowledge creation through 
market entry and competition comes at a cost.  Some of these SMEs later failed due to a 
lack of sufficient resources and capabilities. Yet, such costs have to be measured against 
the substantial benefits of these policies, which helped integrate parts of Taiwan's SME 
sector into the computer industry and generated a critical mass of knowledge. This 
particular type of industrial policy has also helped to develop Taiwan's flexible and low-
cost domestic subcontracting system and its linkages with large domestic and foreign 
firms. Before we address these network relations, we need to highlight the role played by 
FDI.   
IV. CATALYTIC ROLE OF INWARD FDI 
 
  Inward FDI played an important catalytic role for knowledge creation throughout 
development of Taiwan´s electronics industry. It is important to emphasize the diversity 
                                                            
29 Liu, 1993, pages 306 and 307. This includes low-interest loans, the right to retain earnings of up to 200 
percent of paid-in-capital, a five-year income tax holiday within the first nine years of operation, 
accelerating depreciation of R&D equipment, and low-cost land. 
30 Interview  with Dr. Cheng, Director, CCL (Computer and Communications Laboratories)/ITRI, May 
1995. See also the excellent analysis in San Gee, 1995, pages 173 passim.  11 
and evolutionary nature of these contributions. During the critical early phase, FDI 
exposed Taiwanese workers and managers to new organizational techniques, graduallly 
eroding traditional, highly authoritarian and ultimately inefficient management practices.  
Over time, the need to comply to some minimum international quality standards gave rise 
to broader learning effects that spilled over to a wide spectrum of local enterprises due to 
the high turnover in Taiwan´s skilled labor market.  A questionnaire survey of 318 
Taiwanese electronics firms found that 104 of these companies had high-level managers 
and engineers with work experience in foreign electronics firms (San Gee, 1990). Of 
these, roughly 43 percent felt that their working experience with foreign firms was helpful 
for their management skills, 31 percent said that it was useful for product design and 
development, and almost 30 percent that it enhanced their capacity to generate market 
information. 
 
  Inward FDI also contributed to the development of local suppliers, at least for 
domestic market-oriented production.  A combination of protection and local content 
requirements, directed especially at Japanese consumer electronics manufacturers, forced 
these companies to pull along their main Japanese component suppliers.  Together, they 
systematically groomed local vendors and established a broad range of local supplier 
networks.  
 
  The pioneer was Philips which in 1961 established a large local manufacturing 
affiliate that produced TV sets, audio equipment, picture tubes and a variety of other 
related components.  Originally, this production facility was geared to the heavily 
protected local market, but by the mid-1960s, domestic market-oriented production had 
been supplemented by export platform production.  Philips Taiwan is now the exclusive 
production source for picture tubes for computer monitors within the entire Philips group, 
and it is among the three largest producers worldwide.  Similarly, Philips played a critical 
role in the successful launching of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation 
(TSMC) which today is the world’s leading silicon foundry. 
 
  In 1962, Matsushita followed suit with a large majority-owned joint venture in 
Keelung that produced both household appliances and consumer electronics, primarily 
TV sets. Until the mid-1980s when the group established a network of huge export 
platform affiliates in Malaysia and Thailand, this was one of Matsushita’s main outposts 
in East Asia. Matsushita´s affiliate has been a trend-setter for Taiwan in factory 
automation (especially for printed circuit board assembly) and for the introduction of 
fastidious quality control management. Matsushita has also given rise to a broad range of 
knowledge spill-overs to local companies, through both employment mobility and the 
formation of local start-up companies. In addition to being an incubator for local 
suppliers, Matsushita established Matsushita Electric Institute of Technology in 1981.  
With a work force of around 40 researchers, the institute’s main functions are ASIC 
design and software engineering, especially the development of Chinese-language 
application programs. 
  12 
  Similar examples can be found for electronic components. Since the late 1960s, 
most of the leading Japanese component producers set up shop in Taiwan or were 
engaged in consignment assembly with a growing share of output going to Japan or 
Japanese affiliates in Asia. These investments played an important catalytic role for 
knowledge creation in Taiwan´s domestic supplier industry, through intense on-the-job 
training and employment turnover as well as through close linkages with local 
subcontractors. More recently, similar developments have occurred in semiconductors: 
second-tier Japanese DRAM producers like Oki and Mistubishi Electric Corp. (MELCO) 
have recently concluded important technology licensing, second-sourcing and joint 
development projects with some of the newly established Taiwanese DRAM producers.  
The same is now happening for large-size CRT picture tubes. 
 
  FDI also acted as a conduit for knowledge transfer in the computer industry. In 
1982, DEC established a large integrated affiliate in Taiwan to produce a broad range of 
products: PC motherboards and chassis, monitors, terminals and printers.  Today, DEC 
Taiwan is the company’s largest assembly line for desktop PCs. For Taiwan, DEC´s 
investment had important positive effects on knowledge creation, through training as well 
as through the development of local suppliers.   
 
  Over time, however, the role of FDI has declined relative to the rapid proliferation 
of international outsourcing arrangements: these arrangements include subcontracting, 
consignment assembly and various forms of OEM contracts, and are no longer confined 
to parts and components but involve high-value added support services such as product 
customization, product design and production technology.    
 
V. KNOWLEDGE OUTSOURCING THROUGH GLOBAL PRODUCTION 
NETWORKS      
VI.1. Stylised Model 
 
  Globalization in the computer industry has culminated in an important 
organizational innovation, the spread of  global production networks (GPN)
 that integrate 
geographically dispersed, yet concentrated and locally specialized clusters.
31 Their main 
purpose is to exploit complementarities that result from the systemic nature of knowledge 
(Antonelli, 1999). Under certain conditions, these networks may enhance the migration of 
knowledge across firm boundaries and national borders; they may also improve the 
opportunities for knowledge sharing and interactive learning without co-location  (e.g., 
Ernst, 2000a and 2000b). 
 
It is important to emphasize the dual nature of knowledge outsourcing through 
GPN. Most debates focus on the strategic rationale underlying knowledge outsourcing by 
large global network flagship companies, and their organizational implications (e.g., Patel 
                                                            
31 The concept of a global production network (GPN) captures the spread of the value chain across firm 
boundaries and national borders. It may, or may not, involve ownership of equity stakes. For details, see 
e.g., Ernst, 1994b, 1997a, 1997b, 1998 b, and 2000a. For empirical case studies on diverse GPN in Asia, 
see Ernst and Ravenhill, 1999, and various chapters in Borrus, Ernst and Haggard (eds.), 2000.  13 
and Pavitt, 1991; and Granstrand et al, 1993.). We look at the other side of the coin: our 
analysis documents how participation in GPN can facilitate knowledge outsourcing by 
Taiwanese computer companies that allows them to overcome some of their size-related 
disadvantages. Three effects of these international linkages can be distinguished: They 
can act as conduits for knowledge transfers for state-of-the-art management approaches as 
well as product and process technologies. At the same time, these linkages can also act as 
catalysts for knowledge creation and capability development within Taiwanese computer 
firms. Thirdly, these linkages may also give rise to joint knowledge creation, with roughly 
symmetrical contributions from the global network flagship and from the Taiwanese 
supplier. It will of course take time for the latter effect to materialize. 
 
A global network flagship company breaks down the value chain into a variety of 
discrete functions and locates them wherever they can be carried out most effectively, 
where they improve the firm’s access to resources and capabilities, and where they are 
needed to facilitate the penetration of important growth markets. The main purpose is to 
gain quick access to lower-cost foreign capabilities that are complementary to the firm´s  
own competencies. Consider a stylized GPN: it combines a large, multi-divisional MNE 
(the  flagship), its subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures, its suppliers and 
subcontractors, its distribution channels and value-added resellers, as well as its R&D 
alliances and a variety of cooperative agreements, such as standards consortia.  
 
The flagship is at the heart of the network: it “… provides … strategic and 
organizational leadership…beyond the resources that, from an accounting perspective, lie 
directly under… (its)…management control.” (Rugman, 1997: 182) The strategy of the 
flagship company thus directly affects the growth, the strategic direction and network 
position of lower-end participants, like Taiwanese computer firms. The flagship derives 
its strength from its control over critical resources and capabilities, and from its capacity 
to coordinate transactions between the different network nodes. Both are the sources of 
its superior capacity for generating economic rents.
32 One critical capability for instance 
is the intellectual property and knowledge associated with setting, maintaining and 
continuously upgrading a de facto market standard. This requires perpetual improvements 
in product features, functionality, performance, cost and quality. It is such 
“complementary assets” (Teece, 1986) that the flagship increasingly outsources.  
 
To mobilize and harness these external capabilities, the flagship must accept a 
certain  dispersion of the value chain. It also must broaden its capability transfer to 
individual nodes of its GPN. The (often unintended) result is a creeping migration of 
knowledge to lower-tier network participants located abroad, such as Taiwanese 
suppliers. For the latter, his creates new possibilities for knowledge outsourcing. While in 
some cases (e.g., “screw-driver” contract assembly), these effects are short-lived, this is 
                                                            
32 I refer of course to Penrose-type rents. Spender (1998, p.433) demonstrates that “… each type of 
knowledge can, in principle, be associated with a different kind of rent and competitive advantage.” Tacit 
social knowledge (which Spender calls  collective) is of critical importance: “The collective knowledge 
which develops as key players interact under conditions of uncertainty leads to Penrose rents, so labelled 
because such activity-based learning lies at the core of her theory of the growth of the firm.”  14 
not necessarily so. Once local value added increases, the flagship needs to facilitate the 
diffusion of a variety of cross-functional, knowledge-intensive support services that are 
intrinsically linked with production (Ernst, 2000d). The latter include for instance tooling 
and equipment, benchmarking of productivity, testing, plastic injection molding, process 
adaptation, product customization, prototyping and ramping-up, and supply chain 
coordination. Even if these activities do not involve formal R&D, they may still give rise 
to considerable learning and innovation.  
 
A GPN can create a virtuous circle of cross-border knowledge migration for two 
reasons. First, it increases the length of the flagship's supply chain, as well as its logistical 
complexity. This creates new gaps and interstices that can be addressed by small, 
specialized suppliers. Over time, they may be able to upgrade their position from simple 
contract manufacturers to providers of integrated service packages, increasing their 
benefits from network participation. As indicated in part I, this has already happened for 
some Taiwanese suppliers. 
 
Second, once this happens, this creates further pressure for a continuous migration 
of knowledge: to the degree that suppliers successfully upgrade their knowledge base, this 
provides an additional incentive for the network flagship to tap into such external 
capabilities. In turn, this requires that the flagship transfers more knowledge-intensive, 
higher value-added support activities to individual network nodes, possibly including   
engineering, product and process development, as well as supply chain coordination. This 
not only reflects the outsourcing logic that we have discussed before. Equally important 
are the increasingly demanding time management requirements: in the computer industry, 
product-life-cycles (PLC) have been cut to the bare minimum; only those firms succeed 
that are first in shipping new products, and that can introduce them simultaneously in all 
major growth markets. This implies that overseas production must now frequently occur 
soon after or in parallel with the launching of new products. Ramping-up production at 
such speed is only possible if key design information is shared more freely between the 
parent company and its overseas affiliates and suppliers. In short, speed-to-market 
requires that engineers across the different nodes of an GPN are plugged into the flagship 
company´s design debates (both on-line and face-to-face) on a regular basis. For 
Taiwanese computer companies, this broadens their scope for knowledge outsourcing.      
      
Taiwan’s participation in global production networks  
 
  A few examples can illustrate how participation in GPN has created new 
opportunities for knowledge outsourcing by Taiwanese computer firms. We focus on the 
most important of such linkages, i.e. manufacturing on an OEM basis.
33 Taiwan´s 
                                                            
33 Definitions of what constitutes an OEM (original equipment manufacturing) contract keep changing. 
Probably the most widely accepted definition refers to arrangements between a brand name company (the 
network flagship) and the contractor (the supplier) where the customer provides detailed technical 
blueprints and most of the components to allow the contractor to produce according to specifications. 
Using this definition of OEM arrangements, we can then distinguish ODM (original design manufacturing) 
as arrangements where the contractor is responsible for design and most of the component procurement, 
with the brand name company retaining exclusive control over marketing.   15 
involvement in the OEM business has gone through different incarnations, from very 
simple arrangements to highly complex ones. Each of these stages has given rise to a 
peculiar pattern of knowledge outsourcing. We demonstrate that these linkages 
overwhelmingly have served as conduits for knowledge transfers as well as catalysts for 
knowledge creation and capability development within Taiwanese computer firms.
34  
 
Taiwan´s entry as a supplier for the international computer industry dates back to 
the mid-1960s.  The breakthrough came in 1966 when IBM set up its International 
Procurement Office (IPO) and started to purchase computer parts and components from 
Taiwan.  IBM’s demanding procedures for product development, production ramp-up and 
quality control as well as its grueling requirements for vendor qualification forced 
Taiwanese firms to radically upgrade their product quality.  It also forced them to develop 
a broad spectrum of capabilities required for manufacturing as well as product design.  In 
the process of qualifying as an IBM supplier, countless Taiwanese firms learned how to 
improve their input procurement and production control methods in order to cut costs, 
improve quality and to speed-up product development cycles and delivery.  IBM 
engineers regularly visited Taiwanese suppliers, screened their production facilities and 
logistics and assisted them to improve their overall efficiency.  These visits included 




  Being an IBM supplier has been a great asset to many Taiwanese firms: buyers 
feel that they can trust a supplier who has been able to cope with the stringent IBM 
procurement requirements. Going through an IBM apprenticeship thus has helped 
Taiwanese firms to overcome their negative image of unreliability and shoddy quality.  It 
has helped them to win more orders from other foreign computer companies. 
 
   Taiwan however had to wait until the early 1980s before it was able to establish 
itself as a credible OEM supplier.  Until then, Japanese firms controlled the higher-end of 
the international OEM market, and Korean chaebol occupied the lower-end market 
segments.  Two external developments helped to change this situation.
36 The first 
occurred in 1982 when the Taiwanese government responded to American pressure and 
declared the cloning of Apple II computers and video games illegal. Taiwanese firms thus 
moved on to clone IBM PCs, which remained legal.  These developments coincided with 
dramatic changes in the computer industry that created a window of opportunity for low-
cost producers ( e.g., Ernst and O’Connor, 1992, chapters II and IV).  In contrast to 
mainframe and mini-computers, PC design is based on standard microprocessors and 
operating systems.  As a result, computers became mass-produced, standardized products 
(commodities).  Barriers to entry to final assembly are low and the key to success for any 
                                                            
34 In a future paper, we will discuss under what conditions these linkages will give rise to joint knowledge 
creation. 
35 According to one source at IBM Taiwan, the mother company dispatched over 400 such missions during 
the 1980s in order to assist Taiwanese suppliers. (Author´s interview at IBM Taiwan) 
36 The following is based on Callon, 1994; Wong Poh Kam, 1995 and author´s  interviews in the Taiwanese 
computer industry since 1987.  16 
“cloning” strategy lies beyond manufacturing.  A critical factor is time-to-market: the PC 
vendor needs guaranteed access to reasonably priced key components and the most up-to-
date operating system; and its supply base for motherboards and other components must 
be able to respond fast and flexibly.  Coping with the first prerequisite required close 
links with Intel and Microsoft, while Taiwan’s flexible domestic SME supplier base 
perfectly suited the second prerequisite. 
 
  A second external factor facilitated Taiwan´s entry into the international OEM 
business.  In 1987, the US government imposed punitive tariffs of 100 percent on 
Japanese PCs, both in response to US-Japanese trade conflicts in semiconductors and as a 
reaction to a perceived violation of COCOM rules by Toshiba.
37  The punitive tariff on 
Japanese suppliers allowed the Taiwanese to demonstrate to American computer 
companies that they could replace the Japanese suppliers with good products at good 
prices, and that they could even deliver more quickly.
38 
   
  Since then major American computer companies have considerably expanded 
their OEM purchases from Taiwanese sources. IBM for instance sources monitors from 
Philips Taiwan and Sampo; motherboards from GVC, Elite and Lung Hwa; power 
supplies from Delta and Sun-Moon-Star and laptops from ASE. Similar arrangements 
exist for all major American computer companies. Japanese computer companies 
followed suit during the early 1990s, once their tight grip over their domestic market was 




Evolutionary Aspects: Upgrading Knowledge Outsourcing within the OEM 
Paradigm 
 
  At the beginning, OEM arrangements were very simple, both in terms of the 
products and the required capabilities. The focus was on low-end desktop PCs and labor-
intensive peripherals, like computer mouse and keyboards.  The OEM customer provided 
detailed technical "blueprints" and technical assistance to allow the Taiwanese contractor 
to produce according to specifications. They also frequently send their engineers to help 
local manufacturers to meet quality standards.  The latter type of knowledge transfer is of 
particular importance as it involves the more elusive, tacit dimensions of knowledge (Bell 
and Pavitt, 1993; and Ernst and Lundvall, 1997). 
 
There is a broad consensus that Taiwanese firms were able to reap substantial 
benefits from this easy phase of OEM.  For example, in a late 1980s survey of 43 
                                                            
37 Toshiba`s clandestine sale of a complex numerically controlled machine tool to the Soviet Union, judged 
to be of high value for arms production, provoked the action. 
38 Although the tariff was removed one year later, it was by then too late for Japanese computer companies 
to recover their lost share in the rapidly moving OEM market. 
39 NEC for instance gets monitors and motherboards from Tatung and Elite, Fujitsu has relied primarily on 
OEM supplies from Acer, and Epson, Canon, Hitachi, Sharp and Mitsubishi have all become major OEM 
customers.  Since 1994, Japanese PC manufacturers heavily rely on OEM contracts with Taiwanese firms 
for notebook computers.  17 
Taiwanese OEM suppliers (27 domestic and 16 foreign invested), roughly 70 percent 
acknowledged that OEM contracts were useful in transferring production technologies 
and in acquiring product design capabilities (San Gee, 1990, table 4.1). Yet, these simple 
forms of OEM also had substantial drawbacks (e.g., Ernst and O´Connor, 1992). 
Suppliers became “locked into” OEM relationships that hindered independent brand 
name recognition and marketing channels.  Profit margins are thinner in OEM sales than 
in own brand sales, which in turn makes it difficult for suppliers to muster the capital 
needed to invest in R&D required for the development of new products. 
 
  In response to these draw-backs, a number of Taiwanese computer companies 
tried to expand their share of own brand-name manufacturing (OBM) sales. Yet, the 
transition to OBM turned out to be difficult, and most companies failed. This is hardly 
surprising: developing a global brand image is costly and involves extreme risks; it is way 
beyond the reach of most Taiwanese companies, with the possible exception of some 
larger companies like Acer. Taiwanese firms are now content to consolidate and upgrade 
their position as OEM suppliers. After falling throughout most of the early 1990s, the 
share of OEM/ODM in all Taiwanese computer hardware sales has increased from 66% 
in 1995 to more than 75% today. In contrast to a widespread perception (e.g., Hobday, 
1995), this may not necessarily harm Taiwan´s computer industry. It is in fact possible to 
argue that successful knowledge outsourcing does not require a sequential move from 
OEM, up to ODM, and then further up to OBM. Instead, Taiwanese suppliers were able 
to learn and to create knowledge through concurrent implementation of these different 
knowledge outsourcing approaches.  
 
  This somewhat counter-intuitive argument can be demonstrated both theoretically 
and empirically. Drawing on competence-based theories of the firm, Lee and Chen (1998, 
p.4) demonstrate that “… concentrating in either type of business activity exclusively will 
not be better than concurrently engaging in both OBM and OEM/ODM businesses”. It is 
through such concurrent and multiple linkages that a virtuous circle  between knowledge 
outsourcing and knowledge creation becomes feasible.
40 
 
Concurrent Knowledge Outsourcing  
 
  The example of Acer provides an empirical demonstration of concurrent 
knowledge outsourcing. The company’s involvement in the PC cloning business dates 
back to 1983, when it was among the first Taiwanese companies to introduce an IBM 
XT/PC compatible.  In the same year, Acer had organized Taiwan's first International 
Distributor's Meeting, attended by delegates from over 20 countries.  Building strong 
links with foreign distributors and OEM customers subsequently became an important 
                                                            
40  This reflects the increasing interdependence between design/development and manufacturing  that is 
typical for the computer industry. The more inter-linked they become, the greater will be the opportunities 
for Taiwanese suppliers to expand their knowledge base through concurrent knowledge outsourcing. In 
order to capture this important aspect of knowledge creation management, it is necessary to open the black 
box of  OEM, and to distinguish a diversity of such arrangements in terms of their technological capability 
requirements and their contractual relationships.  18 
priority, complementing Acer's strong domestic roots. In 1988, Acer hired a senior IBM 
executive to reorganize the company with the explicit goal to transform it into a global 
competitor.  Expectations were running high.  IBM was still considered the industry's role 
model; by copying key features of IBM, Acer expected to speed up its leap-frogging 
effort.  In particular, the idea was to increase the company's vertical integration and to 
generate a critical mass of proprietary assets through acquisitions that would enable Acer 
to develop its own brand name image. 
 
  This effort failed miserably.  The IBM manager assumed that change could be 
imposed from above by forcing consensus on the local management.  Such an aggressive 
top-down approach ran into stubborn opposition by Acer's managers and engineers, who 
were used to a substantial amount of decision autonomy. More important however is that 
Acer simply did not have the resources that are necessary to implement such a strategy. 
Acer`s acquisitions of innovative, yet financially troubled US computer companies 
undoubtedly provided access to new knowledge. But this on its own is insufficient - 
substantial additional resources are required to absorb this new knowledge and to diffuse 
it within the company. Only then are there realistic chances that acquisitions will act as 
catalysts for knowledge creation and capability development within the acquiring 
company.  
 
In the case of Acer however, acquisitions led to high losses - to high a burden to 
bear for a medium-sized company. The awakening came in 1991 when Acer posted a loss 
($23 million) for the first time.  Acer's over-ambitious diversification strategy came at the 
worst possible moment.  The PC industry worldwide was swept by a crippling price war, 
as a result of which almost all companies faced a serious profit squeeze. Taiwan's 
computer industry was particularly hard hit and went through a major shake-out.  
 
  Acer`s response was to consolidate its position as an OEM supplier, and to focus 
its OBM strategy on non-OECD markets where the market leaders are not present.
41 The 
goal is to become one of the world´s highest-volume producers of peripheral equipment, 
key components, sub-assemblies and design services, both for Acer's worldwide 
computer assembly plants and for global PC brand name leaders.
42 Acer’s strategy now is 
to leverage its OEM business to generate the necessary financial resources to pursue its 
OBM strategy and to develop capabilities, especially in design and computer networking. 
                                                            
41 After an early success in the US market (#5 spot in the  multi-media PC market segment during 1995), 
Acer had to withdraw almost completely as an OBM supplier. While Acer retained its top position in a 
number of rapidly growing, yet still quite secondary markets like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and South 
Africa, the overall growth of sales revenues for computers has slowed down and Acer has still not 
succeeded to expand its OBM market share in Japan and China. These results are simply too meager to 
support Acer’s ambitious upgrading strategy. 
42 Acer tries to combine the following, not always consistent goals: to establish a credible global brand 
image for a broad mix of "affordably-priced products"; to improve its ability to market such products 
quickly and to adapt them in response to changing market requirements; to penetrate secondary markets in 
Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere in order to gain economies of scale; and to use these countries as a test-
ground for refining its globalization strategy.    19 
Knowledge outsourcing through OEM has become an important vehicle for upgrading 
Acer’s internal knowledge base.  
 
Acer’s experience is consistent with Chandler`s discussion of the difficulties of 
overcoming the first mover advantages of large multinationals (Chandler, 1990). 
However, there is also a positive side to it, related to the dynamics of knowledge 
outsourcing. The story of Acer shows that there is no easy and quick short-cut to success 
and that leap-frogging is an illusionary concept that should be discarded (e.g., Ernst and 
O`Connor, 1989, chapter II; and Hobday, 1995). Developing a firm’s knowledge base is a 
time-consuming and laborious process:  at each stage of its growth, new barriers arise that 
require a period of consolidation. The more Acer and other Taiwanese computer 
companies progress and grow, the more demanding will be the barriers they have to cope 
with. Developing a global brand image is costly and involves extreme risks. This 
precludes a frontal attack on the market leaders. Acer´s approach to “attack from the 
sidelines” and to focus its OBM strategy on non-OECD markets appears to be an 
appropriate response to this dilemma. Taiwanese computer firms will have to rely for 
quite some time on concurrent knowledge outsourcing through OEM contracts. Other 
examples support this view. 
 
Compaq for instance has an interesting arrangement with Inventa, a Taiwanese 
company that has earned a reputation for innovative notebook design and that has already 
supplied notebooks on an original-design-manufacturing  (ODM) basis to Dell and 
Zenith, an affiliate of the French computer firm Bull.  Inventa has only a few hundred 
employees in Taiwan, with a large share of engineers. Inventa is part of the family-owned 
Inventec business group that is involved in a wide range of products and services, but is 
most well-known for calculators and telephones. This provides Inventa with access to 
low-cost volume production facilities that the group has established in China and 
Southeast Asia, primarily Malaysia.  A second attraction of such networks are the 
sophisticated quality control procedures characteristic of Inventec´s manufacturing 
facilities. Inventec made Texas Instrument’s calculators for 15 years, and had to cope 
with TI´s stringent quality requirements.  But probably the most important reason for 
Compaq to link up with Inventa were the company’s specialized design capabilities for 
notebook computers.
43 In order to tap into both sets of capabilities, Compaq had to 
integrate Inventa into its product development dialogue; it also had to share some of its 
tacit knowledge on design-for-manufacturing, and on global supply chain management. 
This provided substantial learning effects for Inventa. 
 
  Compaq also provides another example of the increasing complexity of Taiwan´s  
knowledge outsourcing through OEM. As described in part I, in a recent “turnkey 
production” contract with Mitac, Compaq has out-sourced all stages of the value chain 
for some of its desktop PCs, except marketing for which it retains sole responsibility. 
                                                            
43 In 1994, Compaq was only fourth in the notebook market behind IBM, NEC and Toshiba.  By using 
Inventa´s notebook design, Compaq expected to leapfrog the market leaders, without commiting its own 
limited engineering resources (Wall Street Journal, February 3, 1995, p.B69).  20 
Other global PC brand name leaders have followed Compaq’s example.
44  Turnkey 
production arrangements clearly indicate how rapidly OEM relationships have moved 
beyond production to encompass an increasing variety of knowledge-intensive, high-end 
support services.  The spread of such broad cross-value chain arrangements shows that 
leading global computer companies are confident that Taiwan´s computer industry is now 
sufficiently well integrated into the global pool of specialized knowledge to serve as a 
low-cost, one-stop supply center.  
 
  In short, it is possible to proceed to more sophisticated forms of knowledge 
outsourcing within the OEM trajectory. Paradoxically, an increasing concentration of the 
global computer industry has apparently facilitated this process. The top five industry 
leaders have increased their global market share from roughly 20% during the early 1990s 
to almost 50%; yet, they are all Taiwan´s OEM clients. Their main strength is the 
definition of architectural standards and their global brand image. These global market 
leaders are at the cutting-edge of product development, but they outsource almost 
everything else.  Close interaction with these industry leaders provides Taiwanese 
computer firms with a constant flow of precious feedback information on product design, 
new architectural standards, leading-edge production technology, and sophisticated 
quality control and logistics procedures.  Close links with these industry leaders acts as a 
powerful vehicle for a further strengthening of the learning and innovation capabilities of 
Taiwanese computer firms. 
 
Of even greater importance is a tendency to extend OEM contracts to comprise an 
integrated package of higher-end support services, as illustrated in the turnkey production 
contracts of Compaq with Mitac, and of IBM with Acer.  This implies that, with the 
exception of hard-core R&D and strategic marketing, Taiwan’s OEM supplier community 
must shoulder all steps in the production chain and the coordination functions necessary 
for global supply chain management. A major prerequisite is the capacity to assist foreign 
OEM customers in the management of their global supply chain. All major global players 
have drastically rationalized their global supply chain and are moving rapidly toward 
order-based production. In their choice of OEM suppliers, they demand a capacity for 
just-in-time delivery: for Taiwanese suppliers, this implies that speed and flexibility of 
response are critical; Taiwanese suppliers also must establish their own global network of 
plants and sales affiliates in close proximity to major computer markets. In other words, 
organizational innovation is of increasing importance and can go a long way in 
compensating for weaknesses in technological innovation (Pavitt, 1998). 
 
These fundamental changes in OEM relationships are producing a new and 
somewhat surprising division of labor between large Taiwanese computer majors and 
SMEs.  Large firms appear to rely more on OEM contracts, while SMEs are much more 
active in ODM.  For instance, OEM orders for desktop computers are all concentrated on 
                                                            
44 An interesting example is  IBM which relies on Acer’s  GPN in developing countries to assemble lower-
end IBM desktop and laptop PCs and to distribute and service them. For IBM, Acer´s main attraction is its 
“global operations”, its strong presence in developing countries, and its “ability to tailor its products to each 
market.” The Wall Street Journal, December 6, 1996  21 
a select group of large companies, i.e. Tatung, Acer, DEC Taiwan, FIC and MITAC.  The 
same is true for other scale-sensitive products such as monitors and modems.  This 
sounds counter-intuitive, but OEM contracts come in large orders; they typically generate 
razor-thin profit margins.  Economies of scale and scope are of critical  importance, and 
large firms are better placed to reap such economies.  Time and again, we thus find that 
Chandler’s insistence on the continuous importance of scale and scope economies makes 
perfect sense, even in a fast moving sector like the computer industry (Chandler, 1990). 
Moreover, only a large firm can avoid becoming overly dependent on one particular 
customer.   
 
Smaller firms may find it too risky to depend on large OEM contracts, as each of 
these contracts normally surpasses their maximum production capacity.  They prefer to 
shift to ODM contracts where they have greater chances to sustain a diversified customer 
base and charge higher prices.  This has important implications for Taiwanese-style 
knowledge creation management.  It implies that SMEs are under greater pressure 
relative to large Taiwanese firms to improve their design capabilities to become credible 
niche market players within the overall OEM market. In short, sophisticated knowledge 
outsourcing through ODM can help upgrade technological capabilities of SMEs. Many of 
these SMEs will not succeed, but those that do have good chances to grow and to 
improve their competitive position. 
 
VI. MANAGING INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL  LINKAGES 
 
  Successful knowledge outsourcing through international linkages over time has 
imposed far-reaching changes on the organization of Taiwan´s computer industry, where 
growing concentration has given rise to a polarization between a few large players (the 
first-tier OEM suppliers), and a large number of small, lower-tier suppliers. In turn, this 
has led to important changes in firm organization and management approaches.  
 
Historically, small, family-owned firms have played an important role in the 
development of Taiwan´s electronics industry. Yet, this from of business organization is 
now coming under increasing pressure, and appears to be ill-equipped to deal with the 
new competitive requirements. Family bonds erode, especially when the firm has to move 
production overseas and loose networks between family-owned SMEs are unable to raise 
the capital required for increasing fixed investments and R&D outlays. As a result, 
Taiwanese SMEs had to develop a variety of linkages with third parties and to experiment 
with new forms of managing inter-organizational linkages. In what follows, we will 
highlight three peculiar developments: informal peer group networks; integration into 
loose  cross-sectoral  conglomerates; and the development of sector-specific business 
groups. 
 
Informal “peer group” networks 
 
  Taiwanese SMEs have always relied heavily on informal social networks for 
access to resources, capabilities and knowledge that they are unable to mobilize on their  22 
own. Over time, the focus of these networks has shifted from labor, capital and basic 
market information to technological knowledge and brand name recognition.  Originally, 
these networks were restricted to family and kinship relations. They are now rapidly being 
substituted by professional “peer group” networks.  This is especially true for the 
electronics industry where resource and capability requirements are much more 
demanding than in traditional industries. Due to the heavy brain drain of Taiwanese 
computer engineers, especially into Silicon Valley, these networks increasingly take on an 
international dimension. 
 
  Informal peer group networks come in a variety of forms. Typically, class mates 
(especially in elite schools) and former colleagues (especially in foreign affiliates) form 
tight networks that can be instrumental in the creation of start-up companies.  For 
example, Taiwanese computer firms rely heavily on informal information exchange with 
former classmates for the generation of tacit knowledge on specific engineering and 
marketing problems and when they need confidential information on potential partners or 
competitors.  Interviews at Acer for instance showed that even today, when this company 
has long moved beyond its earlier SME status, senior managers still prefer to contact 
former teachers or class mates when they have to deal with a specific engineering, 
marketing or management problem rather than a commercial consulting firm or a 
technology research institute. 
 
  Acer actually has been a master in the formation of such informal networks; much 
of its success arguably is due to the scope and depth of its peer group linkages.  Founded 
in 1976, the company’s first activity was to run a training center for computer engineers.  
In the first three years, more than 3,000 engineers were trained who later were to occupy 
important positions in Taiwan´s nascent computer industry.  As a result, Acer was able to 
establish early on an extensive network of social contacts within Taiwan´s computer 
community.  These contacts have become an important asset.  Since 1986, Acer Sertek 
Inc, the company’s domestic sales, marketing and service arm, has trained more than 




Over time, linkages with large firms have played an increasingly important role in 
the development of Taiwan´s SME sector  (e.g., San Gee and Wen-jeng Kuo, 1998). They 
have also facilitated knowledge creation in small firms. Many SMEs are now affiliated 
with a particular business group (Liu, Liu and Wu, 1994). The growing capital 
requirements and technological complexity that accompanied the rapid industrial 
transformation of the island produced new forms of business organization. When 
electronics took over from textiles as the leading industrial sector, this led to an erosion 
of Taiwan´s traditional form of business organization: the loose networks of family-
owned SMEs.  In order to retain profitability, family firms were forced to venture across 
product lines and to move from industries with declining margins, like textiles, to the 
much more profitable electronics sector. In most cases however they were unable to raise 
the capital required for increasing fixed investment and R&D: as late as 1992, only 20  23 
percent of a sample of Taiwanese manufacturing firms were engaged in R&D (ibid., 
p.51). 
 
  Attempts to cope with these two conflicting pressures produced a peculiar 
Taiwanese form of business organization: cross-sectoral conglomerates.  These are very 
different from the large, hierarchical conglomerates, the chaebol, that are typical of South 
Korea, but they also differ from the keiretsu system that has dominated much of Japan’s 
industry.  In Taiwan, conglomerates typically consist of a loose network of mostly 
medium-sized companies that produce a variety of products for different markets, with 
one core company exercising financial control. This type of firm organization reflects the 
need to combine the scale advantages of large firms with the speed and flexibility of 
smaller firms. 
 
  The ADI business group provides a typical example. Founded in 1979, the 
company is run by the Liao Jian-cheng family.  From trading and construction it first 
moved into shoe manufacturing for international mass merchandisers.  Around the mid-
1980s, the family decided to move into electronics.  The breakthrough came in 1993, 
thanks to big orders from Compaq.  Despite success in computer monitors, the owners 
maintain their diversification strategy.  ADI has continued to expand its position in shoe 
manufacturing, while at the same time investing in a number of new small start-up 
companies in software, system design, and in a variety of unrelated commercial activities. 
Such unrelated diversification into new, more knowledge-intensive activities could only 
work if the mother company was able to orchestrate an effective transfer of knowledge 
between its different affiliated companies. Much of this knowledge transfer originally was 
channeled through informal peer group networks discussed before. Yet, continuous 
upgrading required the development of more formal inter-organizational linkages, which 
has fostered the development of sector-specific business groups. 
 
Sector-specific business groups 
 
  The development of sector-specific business groups has been most pronounced in 
the computer industry.  This is hardly surprising, given the critical importance in this 
industry of economies of scale and scope.  But in Taiwan’s case, there are two additional 
reasons why SMEs became integrated into larger business groups: linkages with foreign 
customers through international subcontracting and OEM arrangements; and linkages 
with international supply sources, especially for key components.  As a result of these 
linkages, size became essential to secure economies of scale and scope and achieve 
sufficient bargaining clout with foreign customers and suppliers. 
 
  To fulfill an OEM contract, large Taiwanese companies like Tatung, First 
International Computer (which is part of the Formosa Plastics group), Mitac and Acer 
rely on hundreds of loosely affiliated domestic suppliers to which they can pass on an 
endless variety of low-margin, yet quite demanding manufacturing and design tasks.  The 
typical Taiwanese small computer company thus often gets involved with foreign firms 
only in an indirect way; large Taiwanese business groups dominate the direct interface  24 
with foreign customers. To mobilize and harness these external capabilities, the large 
business groups are forced to accept a creeping migration of knowledge to some of these 
smaller suppliers. This is especially true for cross-functional,  knowledge-intensive 
support services for production. 
 
Over the last few years, the importance of sector-specific business groups has 
further increased, as Taiwan's computer industry witnessed a rapid increase in 
concentration: the top 10 firms today control roughly 80 percent of total production, and 
some of the most powerful Taiwanese business groups (Formosa Plastics, HwaHsin, 
China Steel, YFY Paper) have now also entered the production of key components, like 
DRAMs, CRTs and displays. The challenge now is to develop an organization that 
enables them to improve organizational learning. For PC manufacturers, the main role 
model is the Client-Server model, used by rapidly growing companies like Acer or Mitac: 
business units are spun off into independent profit centers, creating a federation of loosely 
connected companies united by four factors: access to common core technologies; access 
to the holding company's financial resources; access to its knowledge base,  market 
intelligence and technology scanning capabilities; and a common  brand name.  This type 
of organizational innovation makes it possible to keep high value-added operations and 
core capabilities in Taiwan, while dispersing sales, marketing, procurement, product 
integration and service operations around the world, in close proximity to the main 
growth markets. 
 
  Each of the different members of a “Client-Server Organization” are separated by 
product lines and by geographic region, and each operates independently.  This allows 
them to make decisions quickly in response to market changes and to define the market 
segments where they feel fit for leadership.  At the same time, however, all of these 
businesses have ready access to the lead company`s knowledge base which considerably 
increases their scope for knowledge creation. One important element of this re-
organization is a new approach to overseas PC assembly.  Acer provides an example.
45  In 
order to reduce cost and increase speed-to-market for new products, Acer has established 
15 modular assembly sites around the world.  Each of these assembly subsidiaries is 
located close to important markets and performs only very limited activities: it receives 
PC housings and floppy disk drives by sea, with motherboards flown in directly to ensure 
delivery of the newest technologies.  Central processing units (CPUs), hard drives and 
memory are sourced locally to fill individual user requirements, and the modular 
components are assembled quickly according to a standardized procedure.  This strategy 
allows Acer to maintain control over product quality and keep inventory to a minimum, 
while providing fast assembly of competitively priced PCs that always contain the latest 
microprocessor generation. 
 
  Widely lauded until recently, this management approach is now running into 
increasing constraints. Two major weaknesses can be identified: First, an  internalist bias, 
where a focus on vertical integration within  the group fails to capture potential benefits 
                                                            
45 Based on author´s interviews at Acer. Similar approaches have been developed by other leading 
Taiwanese computer manufacturers like Mitac and FIC.  25 
of global outsourcing that has now become the dominant organizational model in the PC 
industry (e.g., Sturgeon and Florida, 1999). A second related weakness results from an 
excessive de-decentralization among different “Client-Server” organization members, 
which has given rise to over-extended product diversification, constrained the 
coordination between different value-chain stages, and slowed-down the critically 
important speed-to-market. Equally important is that a combination of an internalist bias 
with loose coordination can have quite negative effects on group-wide quality control. An 
example are Acer`s recent quality image problems in the critical US market. 
 
  In short, successful implementation of knowledge outsourcing through inter-
organizational linkages requires permanent adaptation in firm strategy and structure. To 
the degree that key stages of the value chain have moved beyond the boundaries of the 
firm and across national borders, such adaptation requirements become more demanding 
and complex.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has introduced an alternative conceptual framework that centers on the 
co-evolution of domestic and international knowledge linkages. This framework allows 
us to analyze what permits small firms to compete in globalized high-tech industries. The 
paper demonstrates that inter-organizational knowledge outsourcing is critical for small 
firms that compete in the computer industry. If well organized and managed, such 
external knowledge linkages can effectively compensate for some of the original size-
related disadvantages of small firms, at least for a certain period of time. The paper 
however also shows that external linkages are no substitute for intra-organizational 
knowledge creation. This confirms Edith Penrose´s observation that firms cannot grow 
without developing their own knowledge base. 
 
  The paper also emphasizes that inter-organizational knowledge creation is not 
confined to regional clusters or to the nation state. In industrialized countries, many of 
these external knowledge linkages are with domestic organizations. This is very different 
for a small developing country. When Taiwan began to enter the computer industry 
during the late 1970s, domestic linkages did not exist or were at best embryonic. 
International linkages thus were initially of primary importance. This is in line with the 
findings of research on technological learning in developing countries
46. Two types of 
international linkages have been distinguished: inward FDI and the participation of 
Taiwanese firms in global production networks established by global players. Inward FDI 
has played an important catalytic role for knowledge creation during the early phase of 
the development of Taiwan´s electronics industry.  
 
   Participation in global production networks has provided an important source of 
knowledge outsourcing. Manufacturing on an OEM basis has been the most important of 
                                                            
46 This research has clearly established that successful late industrialization critically depends on the 
international sourcing of knowledge. Examples include Dahlman, Ross-Larson, and. Westphal, 1987; Bell 
and Pavitt, 1993; Nelson. and Pack, 1995;Kim Linsu, 1997; Lall, 1990 and  1997; Ernst and Lundvall, 
1997; and Ernst, Ganiatsos and Mytelka, 1998.  26 
such linkages. Taiwan´s involvement in the OEM business has gone through different 
stages. Each of these stages displayed a peculiar pattern of knowledge outsourcing. It 
started with very simple OEM arrangements that covered low-end desktop PCs and labor-
intensive peripherals. In response to their draw-backs, a number of Taiwanese computer 
companies have tried, during the early 1990s, to expand their share of own brand-name 
manufacturing (OBM) sales. Most of them failed and are now content to consolidate and 
upgrade their position as OEM suppliers. The paper demonstrates that, paradoxically, this 
increasing reliance on OEM arrangements has had positive effects for knowledge 
creation in Taiwan´s computer industry. Contrary to established wisdom, successful 
knowledge outsourcing does not necessarily require a shift from OEM to OBM. 
 
  All of his implies that requirements for knowledge creation have become much 
more demanding: Taiwan’s OEM supplier community must now be able to master all 
steps in the production chain, with the exception of hard-core R&D and strategic 
marketing.  In addition, Taiwanese OEM suppliers must be able to perform for their 
customers coordination functions that are necessary for global supply chain management. 
Most importantly, this implies a move away from informal social networks to a more 
formalized network organization, based on information technology, especially enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) software. It also requires that Taiwanese firms gradually move 
beyond their internalist bias, and increase their own global outsourcing linkages. 
 
  The paper also emphasizes that benefits from international linkages do not come 
automatically. Of critical importance are government policies that have created a set of 
innovative institutions and incentives conducive for inter-organizational knowledge 
creation. Of equal importance were a variety of domestic linkages that range from 
informal peer group networks to a variety of innovations in firm organization that attempt 
to combine the scale advantages of large firms with the speed and flexibility of smaller 
firms. It is shown that, contrary to conventional wisdom, large firms have played a central 
role in the coordination and development of the Taiwanese computer industry; they have 
also acted as important sources for knowledge creation in small firms. 
 
Issues for Future Research 
 
The great advantage of Taiwan´s computer industry has been the incredible speed 
with which it has been able to respond to changes in markets and technology. Such quick 
response and flexibility now needs to be supplemented with industrial deepening—the 
development of a domestic supply base for key components and improved product 
differentiation capabilities. Obviously, this poses a crucial challenge for the Taiwanese 
approach to knowledge creation management. It also highlights important issues for 
future research. 
 
Apart from strengthening their domestic R&D capabilities, Taiwanese firms will 
also need to locate R&D labs as listening posts abroad in the relevant centers of 
excellence in the US, Japan and Europe.  To do this requires a variety of joint ventures 
and strategic alliances with major international electronics firms, i.e. a transition to joint  27 
knowledge creation. Simultaneously, a concerted effort is required to move beyond an 
exclusive focus on hardware production and to complement this with attempts to 
strengthen domestic capabilities in software and information services industries. 
 
The most important issue however that requires empirical research is to what 
degree peculiar features of Taiwanese management practices that were conducive for 
entering the global production network circuit, have now reached their limits. This raises 
for instances questions, like: In light of the pervasive impact of the Internet on the 
organization of the global computer industry, what changes are necessary in firm 
organization and strategy to sustain knowledge outsourcing through international 
linkages? 
 
  All of this will require time.  What matters is that Taiwan has succeeded to 
developing a critical mass of knowledge and capabilities that will help this small island 
economy to cope with future challenges.  The Taiwanese model in the computer industry 
provides clear evidence that small enterprises can succeed in global competition, 
provided they can rely on knowledge outsourcing through inter-organizational and 
international linkages. But to sustain these early achievements, it is necessary to 
continuously upgrade firm organization and strategy. 
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